Are people more or less likely to follow advice that is accompanied by a confidence interval?

Are people more or less likely to follow numerical advice that communicates uncertainty in the form of a confidence interval? Prior research offers competing predictions. Although some research suggests that people are more likely to follow the advice of more confident advisors, other research suggests that people may be more likely to trust advisors who communicate uncertainty. Participants (N = 17,615) in 12 incentivized studies predicted the outcomes of upcoming sporting events, the preferences of other survey responders, or the number of deaths due to COVID-19 by a future date. We then provided participants with an advisor's best guess and manipulated whether or not that best guess was accompanied by a confidence interval. In all but one study, we found that participants were either directionally or significantly more likely to choose the advisor's forecast (over their own) when the advice was accompanied by a confidence interval. These results were consistent across different measures of advice following and did not depend on the width of the confidence interval (75% or 95%), advice quality, or on whether people had information about the advisor's past performance. These results suggest that advisors may be more persuasive if they provide reasonably-sized confidence intervals around their numerical estimates. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Does constructing a belief distribution truly reduce overconfidence?

Can overconfidence be reduced by asking people to provide a belief distribution over all possible outcomes-that is, by asking them to indicate how likely all possible outcomes are? Although prior research suggests that the answer is "yes," that research suffers from methodological confounds that muddle its interpretation. In our research, we remove these confounds to investigate whether providing a belief distribution truly reduces overconfidence. In 10 studies, participants made predictions about upcoming sports games or other participants' preferences, and then indicated their confidence in these predictions using rating scales, likelihood judgments, and/or incentivized wagers. Contrary to prior research, and to our own expectations, we find that providing a belief distribution usually increases overconfidence, because doing so seems to reinforce people's prior beliefs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

A Rare Metastatic Primary Rectal Melanoma in a Geriatric Male.

Primary rectal melanoma (PRM) is an uncommon malignancy whose etiology remains unknown. Most patients present with rectal bleeding. Distant metastasis is commonly seen in the lung and liver. The incidence rates for locoregional lymph node metastases on initial presentation are almost 60%. Histology and immunochemistry are useful and are the gold standard for diagnosis. The prognosis is very poor due to the late presentation of patients. Optimum surgical treatment remains controversial. Abdominoperineal resection was considered traditionally but over time, has been found to have no survival benefit. Current literature and studies, therefore, recommend wide local excision. The beneficial effects of chemotherapy versus radiotherapy use are still debatable. Herein, we discuss a case of a 72-year-old Caucasian male with rectal bleeding found to have metastasized PRM.

Closure of recurrent colovaginal fistulas using AMPLATZER occluder device.

A 79-year-old woman and a 92-year-old woman were referred to the gastroenterology department for management of persistent colovaginal fistula despite surgical and non-surgical management. Both patients had several hospitalisations for recurrent urinary tract infections. After failed surgical management and endoscopy using over-the-scope clipping, both patients underwent endoscopic closure using the Amplatzer cardiac septal occluder device. Both patients underwent successful closure and had no recurrence of symptoms at 6-month follow-up. Although there are several therapies available for persistent colovaginal fistulas, most involve multiple sessions and have high recurrence rate. There have been reports in the literature of cardiac septal occluders being used in the management of upper gastrointestinal tract fistulas, but few cases exist explaining their role in the management of colovaginal fistulas. Our cases demonstrate that cardiac septal occluders may be a viable option for management of fistulas and warrants further studies to reproduce its effectiveness and safety.

Unsterile Subcutaneous Insulin Injections Causing Psoas and Spinal Epidural Abscesses.

Spinal epidural and psoas abscesses have been found to occur together. Most cases described in the literature have been secondary to either hematogenous spread or direct invasion. Risk factors include intravenous drug use and immunosuppression. This case highlights the risk of the use of unsterile subcutaneous insulin injections leading to psoas abscess, which can be complicated by a spinal epidural abscess.

Ascending Cholangitis Caused by Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Species in a Patient With Cystic Fibrosis.

Ascending cholangitis is a bacterial infection of the extra-hepatic biliary system and presents as a life-threatening systemic condition. Increased bacterial loads and biliary obstruction favor bacterial translocation into the vascular and lymphatic systems. Common organisms isolated are Escherichia Coli, Klebsiella, Enterococcus species, and Enterobacter species. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a rare isolate in ascending cholangitis. We present a case of a 24-year-old patient with cystic fibrosis who presented with epigastric abdominal pain, low-grade fever, jaundice, dark urine, and nausea for two days. Initial workup revealed elevated liver enzymes, hyperbilirubinemia, leukocytosis, and an ultrasound which showed common bile duct dilation to 14 mm with choledocholithiasis. He underwent endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) with stone extraction and bile fluid culture. Cultures grew out MRSA and the patient was treated with appropriate antibiotic therapy. The mainstay of therapy for ascending cholangitis is adequate hydration, antibiotics, and biliary decompression. Early recognition of the offending organism is critical in guiding therapy. Current guidelines focus on the empiric treatment of Gram-negative and anaerobic bacteria. Clinicians should be aware of the possibility of less common pathogens (such as MRSA), especially in a patient who is decompensating despite antibiotic therapy.

A Benign Ulcerating Gastric Mass Presenting as Acute Gastrointestinal Hemorrhage.

Gastrointestinal lipomas are rare, often colonic tumors. The stomach is an unusual site of involvement of lipomas, accounting for less than 5% of all gastrointestinal lipomas and less than 3% of all benign gastric neoplasms. They are usually asymptomatic, and symptoms develop as the tumor grows. Gastric lipomas can present with massive bleeding from an ulcerating tumor and can be life-threatening if left untreated. We present a case of an ulcerating gastric lipoma that presented as an acute upper gastrointestinal hemorrhage. The patient was treated with Billroth II procedure and final pathology showed an ulcerating submucosal lipoma. The diagnosis of gastric lipoma is often suspected incidentally on imaging, then confirmed via biopsy. Definitive treatment of large lesions typically requires surgery, however, newer endoscopic techniques are being utilized for resection of these benign tumors.

Does Choice Cause an Illusion of Control?

Previous research suggests that choice causes an illusion of control-that it makes people feel more likely to achieve preferable outcomes, even when they are selecting among options that are functionally identical (e.g., lottery tickets with an identical chance of winning). This research has been widely accepted as evidence that choice can have significant welfare effects, even when it confers no actual control. In this article, we report the results of 17 experiments that examined whether choice truly causes an illusion of control (N = 10,825 online and laboratory participants). We found that choice rarely makes people feel more likely to achieve preferable outcomes-unless it makes the preferable outcomes actually more likely-and when it does, it is not because choice causes an illusion but because choice reflects some participants' preexisting (illusory) beliefs that the functionally identical options are not identical. Overall, choice does not seem to cause an illusion of control.

Publisher Correction: Specification curve analysis.

An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper.

Specification curve analysis.

Empirical results hinge on analytical decisions that are defensible, arbitrary and motivated. These decisions probably introduce bias (towards the narrative put forward by the authors), and they certainly involve variability not reflected by standard errors. To address this source of noise and bias, we introduce specification curve analysis, which consists of three steps: (1) identifying the set of theoretically justified, statistically valid and non-redundant specifications; (2) displaying the results graphically, allowing readers to identify consequential specifications decisions; and (3) conducting joint inference across all specifications. We illustrate the use of this technique by applying it to three findings from two different papers, one investigating discrimination based on distinctively Black names, the other investigating the effect of assigning female versus male names to hurricanes. Specification curve analysis reveals that one finding is robust, one is weak and one is not robust at all.

Prospective outcome bias: Incurring (unnecessary) costs to achieve outcomes that are already likely.

How do people decide whether to incur costs to increase their likelihood of success? In investigating this question, we offer a theory called prospective outcome bias. According to this theory, people tend to make decisions that they expect to feel good about after the outcome has been realized. Because people expect to feel best about decisions that are followed by successes-even when the decisions did not cause those successes-they will pay more to increase their chances of success when success is already likely (e.g., people will pay more to increase their probability of success from 80% to 90% than from 10% to 20%). We find evidence for prospective outcome bias in nine experiments. In Study 1, we establish that people evaluate costly decisions that precede successes more favorably than costly decisions that precede failures, even when the decisions did not cause the outcome. Study 2 establishes, in an incentive-compatible laboratory setting, that people are more motivated to increase higher chances of success. Studies 3-5 generalize the effect to other contexts and decisions and Studies 6-8 indicate that prospective outcome bias causes it (rather than regret aversion, waste aversion, goals-as-reference-points, probability weighting, or loss aversion). Finally, in Study 9, we find evidence for another prediction of prospective outcome bias: people prefer small increases in the probability of large rewards (e.g., a 1% improvement in their chances of winning $100) to large increases in the probability of small rewards (e.g., a 10% improvement in their chances of winning $10). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

99% impossible: A valid, or falsifiable, internal meta-analysis.

Several researchers have relied on, or advocated for, internal meta-analysis, which involves statistically aggregating multiple studies in a paper to assess their overall evidential value. Advocates of internal meta-analysis argue that it provides an efficient approach to increasing statistical power and solving the file-drawer problem. Here we show that the validity of internal meta-analysis rests on the assumption that no studies or analyses were selectively reported. That is, the technique is only valid if (a) all conducted studies were included (i.e., an empty file drawer), and (b) for each included study, exactly one analysis was attempted (i.e., there was no p-hacking). We show that even very small doses of selective reporting invalidate internal meta-analysis. For example, the kind of minimal p-hacking that increases the false-positive rate of 1 study to just 8% increases the false-positive rate of a 10-study internal meta-analysis to 83%. If selective reporting is approximately zero, but not exactly zero, then internal meta-analysis is invalid. To be valid, (a) an internal meta-analysis would need to contain exclusively studies that were properly preregistered, (b) those preregistrations would have to be followed in all essential aspects, and (c) the decision of whether to include a given study in an internal meta-analysis would have to be made before any of those studies are run. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

P-curve won't do your laundry, but it will distinguish replicable from non-replicable findings in observational research: Comment on Bruns & Ioannidis (2016).

p-curve, the distribution of significant p-values, can be analyzed to assess if the findings have evidential value, whether p-hacking and file-drawering can be ruled out as the sole explanations for them. Bruns and Ioannidis (2016) have proposed p-curve cannot examine evidential value with observational data. Their discussion confuses false-positive findings with confounded ones, failing to distinguish correlation from causation. We demonstrate this important distinction by showing that a confounded but real, hence replicable association, gun ownership and number of sexual partners, leads to a right-skewed p-curve, while a false-positive one, respondent ID number and trust in the supreme court, leads to a flat p-curve. P-curve can distinguish between replicable and non-replicable findings. The observational nature of the data is not consequential.

Extremeness Aversion Is a Cause of Anchoring.

When estimating unknown quantities, people insufficiently adjust from values they have previously considered, a phenomenon known as anchoring. We suggest that anchoring is at least partially caused by a desire to avoid making extreme adjustments. In seven studies ( N = 5,279), we found that transparently irrelevant cues of extremeness influenced people's adjustments from anchors. In Studies 1-6, participants were less likely to adjust beyond a particular amount when that amount was closer to the maximum allowable adjustment. For example, in Study 5, participants were less likely to adjust by at least 6 units when they were allowed to adjust by a maximum of 6 units than by a maximum of 15 units. In Study 7, participants adjusted less after considering whether an outcome would be within a smaller distance of the anchor. These results suggest that anchoring effects may reflect a desire to avoid adjustments that feel too extreme.

False-Positive Citations.

We describe why we wrote "False-Positive Psychology," analyze how it has been cited, and explain why the integrity of experimental psychology hinges on the full disclosure of methods, the sharing of materials and data, and, especially, the preregistration of analyses.

Do People Inherently Dislike Uncertain Advice?

Research suggests that people prefer confident to uncertain advisors. But do people dislike uncertain advice itself? In 11 studies ( N = 4,806), participants forecasted an uncertain event after receiving advice and then rated the quality of the advice (Studies 1-7, S1, and S2) or chose between two advisors (Studies 8-9). Replicating previous research, our results showed that confident advisors were judged more favorably than advisors who were "not sure." Importantly, however, participants were not more likely to prefer certain advice: They did not dislike advisors who expressed uncertainty by providing ranges of outcomes, giving numerical probabilities, or saying that one event is "more likely" than another. Additionally, when faced with an explicit choice, participants were more likely to choose an advisor who provided uncertain advice over an advisor who provided certain advice. Our findings suggest that people do not inherently dislike uncertain advice. Advisors benefit from expressing themselves with confidence, but not from communicating false certainty.

Psychology's Renaissance.

In 2010-2012, a few largely coincidental events led experimental psychologists to realize that their approach to collecting, analyzing, and reporting data made it too easy to publish false-positive findings. This sparked a period of methodological reflection that we review here and call Psychology's Renaissance. We begin by describing how psychologists' concerns with publication bias shifted from worrying about file-drawered studies to worrying about p-hacked analyses. We then review the methodological changes that psychologists have proposed and, in some cases, embraced. In describing how the renaissance has unfolded, we attempt to describe different points of view fairly but not neutrally, so as to identify the most promising paths forward. In so doing, we champion disclosure and preregistration, express skepticism about most statistical solutions to publication bias, take positions on the analysis and interpretation of replication failures, and contend that meta-analytical thinking increases the prevalence of false positives. Our general thesis is that the scientific practices of experimental psychologists have improved dramatically.

Rejecting a bad option feels like choosing a good one.

Across 4,151 participants, the authors demonstrate a novel framing effect, attribute matching, whereby matching a salient attribute of a decision frame with that of a decision's options facilitates decision-making. This attribute matching is shown to increase decision confidence and, ultimately, consensus estimates by increasing feelings of metacognitive ease. In Study 1, participants choosing the more attractive of two faces or rejecting the less attractive face reported greater confidence in and perceived consensus around their decision. Using positive and negative words, Study 2 showed that the attribute's extremity moderates the size of the effect. Study 3 found decision ease mediates these changes in confidence and consensus estimates. Consistent with a misattribution account, when participants were warned about this external source of ease in Study 4, the effect disappeared. Study 5 extended attribute matching beyond valence to objective judgments. The authors conclude by discussing related psychological constructs as well as downstream consequences. (PsycINFO Database Record

When does making detailed predictions make predictions worse?

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 145(10) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: General (see record 2016-42695-001). In the article, the symbols in Figure 2 were inadvertently altered in production. All versions of this article have been corrected.] In this article, we investigate whether making detailed predictions about an event worsens other predictions of the event. Across 19 experiments, 10,896 participants, and 407,045 predictions about 724 professional sports games, we find that people who made detailed predictions about sporting events (e.g., how many hits each baseball team would get) made worse predictions about more general outcomes (e.g., which team would win). We rule out that this effect is caused by inattention or fatigue, thinking too hard, or a differential reliance on holistic information about the teams. Instead, we find that thinking about game-relevant details before predicting winning teams causes people to give less weight to predictive information, presumably because predicting details makes useless or redundant information more accessible and thus more likely to be incorporated into forecasts. Furthermore, we show that this differential use of information can be used to predict what kinds of events will and will not be susceptible to the negative effect of making detailed predictions.